Efforts to combat the COVID-19 crisis brought mountains of legislation and guidance to coerce or encourage people to stay at home and reduce the spread of the virus. During peak lockdown in the United Kingdom regulations defined when people could or could not leave their homes. Meanwhile guidance on social distancing advised people to stay within ‘households’. This paper explores the legislation under lockdowns in the UK from March to October 2020 and the implications for women’s gendered caring roles. The (...) regulations and guidance assumed that households were separate units and ignored the interdependencies which exist between households and between individuals and wider society. The continuing focus in the lockdown regulations has been on households as autonomous, safe, adequate and secure. This overlooks the interdependency of human life, gendered aspects of caring and the inequalities of housing and living conditions, highlighted by feminist scholarship. (shrink)

Q: If necessity is the mother of invention, whence necessity? A. : The matrix of necessity in God-talk is religious experience, philosophically interpreted. The interpreters, theists and non-thesists, have indeed been inventive.

We all ‘know’ that public opinion came to prominence in the political vocabulary of the late eighteenth century. It may be that this dates its rise a bit late, but it is not relevant to argue the matter here. My concern is rather that we be equally aware of the purposes for which people made use of the concept. Here I wish to consider various possible contexts for speaking or writing of public opinion, or ‘opinion’, as it was usually called (...) prior to the mid-eighteenth century. It may be possible to define, more fully than heretofore, the work that the expression did in eighteenth-century thought. As contemporary students of public opinion have been learning, an answer to this question may not even be wholly irrelevant to the task of specifying the nature of public opinion in our own time. (shrink)

This monograph develops a unified theoretical framework for understanding identity as a recursive informational process. It analyzes identity not as a property of a substrate but as a dynamic, self‑referential architecture that generates continuity across temporal, contextual, and systemic transformations. The framework identifies three foundational structural principles—Integration, Coherence, and Recursive Coupling—as the minimal grammar through which identity‑bearing patterns emerge, stabilize, and evolve. The model explains how systems maintain continuity through fixed‑point dynamics, nonlinear feedback, and path‑dependent self‑organization, independent of any specific (...) material realization. A structure‑before‑discipline orientation grounds the approach, deriving explanatory force from minimal structural conditions rather than domain‑specific conceptual traditions. A Systemic Pattern‑Structure Analysis (SMSA) is used to identify the smallest necessary set of structural relations from which recursive identity arises. An accompanying Entry Note provides an accessible orientation to the core intuition and conceptual posture of the framework, outlining the minimal conditions required for identity to emerge as a process. Together, the monograph and the Entry Note offer a coherent theoretical basis for system‑theoretical, computational, and structural approaches to identity. (shrink)

This work develops a formal, substrate‑independent account of emergent identity, treating emergence not as a phenomenological label but as a recursive generative process. Building on the broader research program established in Recursive Identity: Structural Conditions of Emergent Continuity – A Theoretical Monograph, Toward Hybrid Architectures, and Theory of Hybrid Postbiological Continuity, the paper articulates a structural architecture in which identity arises from multi‑level stabilization, cross‑layer invariance, and recursive coupling. The result is a unified explanatory framework applicable to biological, artificial, and (...) hybrid systems, offering a paradigm shift from descriptive to mechanistic models of emergence and continuity. (shrink)

This work develops a systems‑theoretical and process‑ontological account of life and identity as recursively organized, substrate‑independent pattern processes. It introduces a general framework in which biological, hybrid, and postbiological forms of identity can be described under shared structural principles of pattern stability, recursion, and continuity. Central concepts include the triadic preservation architecture, the functional membrane as identity‑generating boundary, and the Z‑process as the recursive mechanism through which identity‑bearing patterns emerge, stabilize, reorganize, and persist across different realization spaces. The theory positions (...) postbiological continuity not as a speculative or technological projection but as a structural consequence of recursive identity itself. This curated extended edition expands the conceptual architecture of the German master‑of‑record version and provides a coherent foundation for the analysis of substrate‑neutral forms of life and identity. (shrink)

A scaled meta‑architectural framework is developed that extends the structural logic of identity, emergence, and agency to the largest possible process space: the cosmos. Rather than offering a traditional cosmological theory, the work generalizes the layered model of meta‑identity and emergent coherence to a maximally scaled system. The same architectural principles that govern the formation of stable identities in cognitive, artificial, and social systems are shown to apply at cosmological scale: negative possibility spaces, operator‑exclusion, layered constraint formation, and the emergence (...) of coherent structures from non‑structure. Within this framework, familiar cosmological phenomena — such as black holes, spacetime curvature, and large‑scale structure — are treated not as isolated physical facts but as manifestations of the same underlying architectural dynamics. The cosmos becomes the largest instantiation of a general pattern of structure formation. This approach unifies earlier work on meta‑identity (LMIC), emergent agency (MAE), and distributed constraint dynamics (ACDM) under a single, scale‑invariant framework. The result is a theory of structure formation relevant not only for metaphysics and philosophy of nature but also for AI architecture, machine identity, and the study of autonomous systems. The principles enabling artificial systems to form stable identities are argued to be identical to those governing the emergence of large‑scale coherence in the universe. In this sense, the work is less about cosmology and more about the general conditions under which identity, agency, and structure can exist at all — with the cosmos serving as the maximal example. (shrink)

Extant semantic theories for languages containing vague expressions violate intuition by delivering the same verdict on two principles of classical propositional logic: the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Supervaluational treatments render both valid; many-Valued treatments, Neither. The core of this paper presents a natural deduction system, Sound and complete with respect to a 'mixed' semantics which validates the law of noncontradiction but not the law of excluded middle.

What follows is a discussion, in three parts, of the African concept of ubuntu and related issues. In the first part of the discussion J.A.I. Bewaji assesses an essay by W.M.J. van Binsbergen on Ubuntu and the Globalisation of Southern African Thought and Society (2001). In the second part Bewaji reviews M.B. Ramose's African Philosophy through Ubuntu (2002). And in the third part Ramose responds to both Bewaji and Van Binsbergen. Although Ramose disagrees with some of Bewaji's comments and interpretations (...) – especially with regard to the thesis on which ubuntu is, according to the former, founded (i.e. “that ontology proper is a rheology”) – both Bewaji and Ramose agree that Van Binsbergen's critique of ubuntu philosophy, and specifically of Ramose's explication thereof, is untenable. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(4) 2003: 378-414. (shrink)

We would like to thank Dolega and Dewhurst for a thought-provoking and informed deconstruction of our article, which we take as applause from valued members of our audience. In brief, we fully concur with the theatre-free formulation offered by Dolega and Dewhurst and take the opportunity to explain why we used the Cartesian theatre metaphor. We do this by drawing an analogy between consciousness and evolution. This analogy is used to emphasize the circular causality inherent in the free energy principle. (...) We conclude with a comment on the special forms of active inference that may be associated with selfawareness and how they may be especially informed by dream states. (shrink)

Condensed detachment is usually regarded as a notation, and defined by example. In this paper it is regarded as a rule of inference, and rigorously defined with the help of the Unification Theorem of J. A. Robinson. Historically, however, the invention of condensed detachment by C. A. Meredith preceded Robinson's studies of unification. It is argued that Meredith's ideas deserve recognition in the history of unification, and the possibility that Meredith was influenced, through ukasiewicz, by ideas of Tarski going back (...) at least to 1939, and possibly to 1930 or earlier, is discussed. It is proved that a term is derivable by substitution and ordinary detachment from given axioms if and only if it is a substitution instance of a term which is derivable from these axioms by condensed detachment, and it is shown how this theorem enables the ideas of ukasiewicz and Tarski mentioned above to be formalized and extended. Finally, it is shown how condensed detachment may be subsumed within the resolution principle of J. A. Robinson, and several computer studies of particular Hilbert-type propositional calculi using programs based on condensed detachment or on resolution are briefly discussed. (shrink)

A sensitive and intelligent inquiry into the nature of mysticism, with special emphasis upon the question as to whether mystical experience is subjective only, or can reasonably be said to refer to an objective reality. There are also careful and valuable discussions of the relation of mysticism to religion and ethics, and of its implications for logic, language, and a theory of immortality.--J. A. B.

The widely accepted supposition that Newton’s De gravitatione was written in 1684/5 just before composing the Principia is examined. The basis for this determination has serious difficulties starting with the failure to examine the numerical estimates for the resistance of aether. The estimated range is not nearly nil as claimed but comparable with air at or near the earth’s surface. Moreover, the evidence provided most likely stems from experiments by Boyle, Hooke, and others in the 1660s and does not use (...) evidence available in the late 1684. The document supports Newton’s contention that the aether medium incorporates very large voids thereby proving that body and space differ but does by no means completely reject its corporeal nature or eliminate its resistance. Newton’s use of the term inertia provides no conclusive evidence for a late date as often claimed and his definition of gravitas is difficult to reconcile with a late one. (shrink)

Introduction: In The Netherlands, physicians have to be convinced that the patient suffers unbearably and hopelessly before granting a request for euthanasia. The extent to which general practitioners (GPs), consulted physicians and members of the euthanasia review committees judge this criterion similarly was evaluated. Methods: 300 GPs, 150 consultants and 27 members of review committees were sent a questionnaire with patient descriptions. Besides a “standard case” of a patient with physical suffering and limited life expectancy, the descriptions included cases in (...) which the request was mainly rooted in psychosocial or existential suffering, such as fear of future suffering or dependency. For each case, respondents were asked whether they recognised the case from their own practice and whether they considered the suffering to be unbearable. Results: The cases were recognisable for almost all respondents. For the “standard case” nearly all respondents were convinced that the patient suffered unbearably. For the other cases, GPs thought the suffering was unbearable less often (2–49%) than consultants (25–79%) and members of the euthanasia review committees (24–88%). In each group, the suffering of patients with early dementia and patients who were “tired of living” was least often considered to be unbearable. Conclusions: When non-physical aspects of suffering are central in a euthanasia request, there is variance between and within GPs, consultants and members of the euthanasia committees in their judgement of the patient’s suffering. Possible explanations could be differences in their roles in the decision-making process, differences in experience with evaluating a euthanasia request, or differences in views regarding the permissibility of euthanasia. (shrink)

In this paper I present the genesis of R 0 in demography, ecology and epidemiology, from embryo to its current adult form. I argue on why it has taken so long for the concept to mature in epidemiology when there were ample opportunities for cross-fertilisation from demography and ecology from where it reached adulthood fifty years earlier. Today, R 0 is a more fully developed adult in epidemiology than in demography. In the final section I give an algorithm for its (...) calculation in heterogeneous populations. (shrink)

We prove that compactness is equivalent to the amalgamation property, provided the occurrence number of the logic is smaller than the first uncountable measurable cardinal. We also relate compactness to the existence of certain regular ultrafilters related to the logic and develop a general theory of compactness and its consequences. We also prove some combinatorial results of independent interest.

In arbitrating between representational and relational theories of perception, perceptual illusions—cases in which a subject’s perceptual experience diverges from the way the world really is—constitute an important battleground. The debate has, however, been dominated by discussions of visual perception. In attempting to extend the debate to audition, it is appropriate to start by considering what is thought to be a key case of auditory illusion. I consider the phenomenon of the ‘missing fundamental’, as well as examining a notion that is (...) often deployed by representationalists to explain it—namely, perceptual inference. Though it is frequently deployed as an explanatory concept by inferentialists, the notion of perceptual inference is somewhat opaque. Here, I formulate a ‘job description’ for perceptual inference, involving rule-following. I then identify two sets of cases that commonly prompt the invocation of perceptual inference: namely, cases of perceptual illusion, and cases of veridical perception where the perceptual content outstrips the information present in the stimulus. I then argue that an appeal to perceptual inference is unnecessary, in the case of the missing fundamental, for two reasons. Firstly, the missing fundamental is not, after all, a clear candidate for the ascription of inferential capacity to the auditory system: it is neither an illusion, nor is it the case that the stimulus is crucially impoverished. That is, it submits to a ‘direct’ explanation. Secondly, given the adequacy of a simpler explanation, and the difficulty between distinguishing between real rule-following and the mere appearance of it, I argue that we should avoid ascribing inferential capacity to the auditory system. I close by considering objections, and offering replies. (shrink)

A textbook intended largely for beginning students in ethics. In a very interesting concluding chapter, Prof. Garnett presents and justifies his own view of the meaning of ethical terms and of the nature of moral principles. One section of the book is as unusual as it is valuable: it contains collections of opinions on such practical problems as marriage and the family, right of property, and war.--J. A. B.

ABSTRACT In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in (...) the cerebral cortex which can be ascertained through EEG readings. Second, we isolate from other notions of a‘functioning brain’that which is required to underpin the view that a cortex is functioning in a way which could give rise to rudimentary conscious experiences. We investigate the development in the human fetus of the anatomical and chemical pathways which underpin (immature) cortical activity and the growth and maturation of the electrical circuitry specifically associated with sensational content in adult experience. We conclude (tentatively) that a fetus becomes conscious at about 30 to 35 weeks after conception; an answer based on a careful analysis of EEG readings at various stages of cortical development. Finally, we survey the possible ethical ramifications of our answer. (shrink)

Solmsen presents an interesting discussion of Aristotle's physical theory. He considers each topic, such as genesis, time, the infinite, in terms of Aristotle's similarities and differences with Pre-Socratic and Platonic thought. His results are piece-meal because "Aristotle himself does not investigate each topic of his physical system with his mind focused on a final synthesis of all major conclusions."--J. A. B.